I'll waste my time and translate some parts of first site for you, then... Razz Sorry for all mistakes and possible construction errors, I usually translated this word after word, so some sentences might look funny-constructed.
Why this storm failed - analyzis
In Bieslana, for each 1 killed or captured terrorist almost 10 hostages died - such proportion signs absolutele catastrophe.
Why comandoo attacked?
We don't know. It's very unlike, that the attack was preppared storm to free the hostages. No professional antiterrorist wouldn't attack school in Bieslana during day, because it would end with death of lots of hostages. The storm was most likely planned, but during the night.
Propably then, antiterrorists were provoked to attack by terrorists. If to (some crisis-case institution) came the information, that terrorists kill the hostages, attack must have been instant, without thinking. But antiterrorists around the world have 2 storm plans - one preppared for ideal day and time, and second for such a suprising situation. The method of performing action in Bieslana proves, that Russians didn't have second plan, and terrorists suprised them.
If it would be proven that - as one of version says - the beginning of the storm was provoken by blowing a piece of wall by terrorists, it would mean they made an unbelievable mistake.
Could this attack be performed better?
Surely, it would be possible to preppare for it better. Russians had more than 2 day/night cycles to gather in place proper forces and equipment. As unproved information claim, special forces were used during attack, but they weren't soldiers trained in saving hostages, but unit preppared for military action. They're trained different way, during action more important is to immobile enemy rather than save hoistages.
Is there any other evidence that the attack was a total failure?
Yes. A total failure was trail of surrounding the school with safety cordon. No terrorist should have escaped the school - and escaped almost several. Police and military didn't remove civilians from the surroundings of school, there were too many people arround, usually armed. This disabled coordination between various units, and even despite that in Russia it almost doesn't exist (the coordination). 2 years ago, head russian newspaper "Military thought" warned, that "antiterroristic actions are made harder by the lack of coordination between police, military and local rule."
West, places to hold hostages are strictly isolated. In near surroundings only negotiators or comandoo may be. No one can provoke terrorists - visibility of weapons, nervous police behavior or existence of civilian spectators. If in Bieslana someone made terrorists think that the storm begins, it was error of people on which the whole action depended.
After the attack we saw great chaos - unorderly running sanitarians, no ambulances, crowds of armed soldiers mixed with civilians. Such situation doesn't only make storm harder to perform, but primarily makes escape more possible for terrorists and decreases chances of survival or the most wounded.
The fight in the building lasted too long. Most likely, antiterrorists didn't know how many people occupy the building and where they are located. From history of antiterroristic actions we know, that each next second of operation multiplies risk of hostage death. Most spectacular antiterroristic actions were performed within 30 to 90 seconds.
Has Russia, for years devoured by terroristic attacks, a professional antiterroristic unit?
No. In USSR few special units were creates, like famous Alfa, also Wypieł, Dolphin and few other groups with colorful names. All are comandoo units, who existed to, in case of WWIII, attack western targets. They were trained to kill, not to save.
Antiterroristic groups have, in Russia, police forces of different republics and areas, also FSB. But they lack professional training and modern equipment.
Cremlin since today didn't make his own procedure of acting in AT actions - about who negotiates, how informations are gathered, which units attacks, not procedures or situations decide, but local rulers' and generals' influence. As russian observers claim, in Bieslana Specnaz attacked - unit preppared for militaryattacks after front line, not for saving civilians. In the world commandoos are highly specialised - experts of chasing Osama ben Laden won't be able to siege school captured by terrorists and vice versa.
Russian experts often write about power of their AT forces. Despite the fact that all russian AT actions after fall of USSR ended with massacres.
